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Rather than about absolute payoffs, governments in fiscal competition often seem to care 
about their performance relative to other governments. Moreover, they often appear to mimic 
policies observed elsewhere. We study such behaviour in a tax competition game with mobile 
capital à la Zodrow-Mieszkowski. Both with relative payoff concerns and for imitative 
policies, evolutionary stability is the appropriate solution concept. It renders tax competition 
more aggressive than with best-reply policies (Nash equilibrium). Whatever the number of 
jurisdictions involved, an evolutionary stable tax policy coincides with the competitive 
outcome of a tax competition game played among infinitely many governments. Tax 
competition among boundedly rational governments, thus, involves drastic efficiency losses. 
JEL Code: H77, H75, C73. 
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Models of ﬁscal competition routinely analyse Nash equilibria of intergovernmental games.
Underlying the idea of a Nash-equilibrium is the hypothesis of best-reply behaviour: Gov-
ernments set their policies in response to those of other governments with the aim of max-
imizing their own payoﬀs (whatever this may be: social welfare, the utility of a Leviathan
decision-maker, re-election probabilities of politicians, tax revenues etc.)
In this paper, we depart from the hypotheses of best-response play and payoﬀ maxi-
mization and analyse tax competition from a behavioural perspective. We, ﬁrst, consider
governments that care about relative payoﬀs, i.e., governments that aim at maximizing the
distance between their own payoﬀ and that in other jurisdictions (on the same hierarchical
level in a federal system). Second – but, as will turn out, with an identical prediction for
long-run outcomes – we analyse dynamic ﬁscal interactions where (boundedly rational)
governments mimic tax strategies of other governments that have performed well in the
previous period of the game.
Adding to the literature on ﬁscal competition concerns about relative performance and/or
imitative behaviour is motivated by a number of suggestive theoretical and empirical
observations:
• The theory of yardstick competition – which underlies the hypothesis that ﬁscal
decentralization dominates centralization on informational grounds – posits that in
a multi-jurisdictional setting politicians face a “rank tournament” (Salmon, 1987;
Besley and Case, 1995): Voters can observe policy outcomes in other jurisdictions
and compare them to domestic policies. Hence, politicians expect that a good [poor]
relative performance will increase [diminish] their popularity. If voters consider
relative performance important, rational politicians will share that view.
• Empirical evidence indicates that rather than optimizing their policies, (local) gov-
ernments often simply adopt successful policies observed elsewhere. This encom-
passes both tax policies and expenditure patterns.1 While there exist several poten-
tial motives for unison policies (tax competition, reference points, lack of inventive
1In the context of taxation, mimicking has been observed with local jurisdictions, e.g., in the U.S.
(Ladd, 1992), Belgium (Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998), The Netherlands (Allers and Elhorst, 2005),
Spain (Sol´ e-Oll´ e, 2003), Italy (Bordignon et al. 2003), Germany (B¨ uttner, 2001) or Switzerland (Feld
and Reulier, 2009). It also seems to prevail in international tax competition (Altshuler and Goodspeed,
2006). Revelli (2006) ﬁnds evidence for mimicking expenditure patterns in the social service provision of
UK local authorities; Kelejian and Robinson (1993) for police expenditure in US counties; Heyndels and
1talent, saving costs of decision making etc.), the most likely source of tax and
expenditure mimicking seems to be concerns about the relative standing vis-` a-vis
other governments (see Case, 1993; Allers and Elhorst, 2005; Bordignon et al., 2003;
Sol´ e-Oll´ e, 2003; for an exception see Geys, 2006).
• Since the Lisbon summit, the European Union has endorsed the so-called Open
Method of Coordination (OMC) as one of its modes of governance. The OMC is
an iterative procedure of mimicking and experimenting (Zeitlin, 2007). It promotes
that national governments adopt what turned out to be best-practise policies. The
eﬀectiveness of the OMC hinges on the assumption that governments – for fear of
peer pressure, naming and shaming, or bad press – care about relative rather than
about absolute performance.
• Inspired by Hayekian ideas, ﬁscal competition is often regarded as advantageous
over centralization as a discovery procedure and selection mechanism for policy
innovations. Like in a laboratory, autonomous local governments can experiment
with new policies without causing big damage to the economy as a whole (Oates,
1999, section 5). In an evolutionary process of imitation and learning, best practices
will then spread across jurisdictions, improving eﬃciency over time. While such
ideas are widely quoted and even thought to underlie shifts in real-world federal
systems,2 hardly any theoretical research exists on the validity of such evolutionary
hypotheses.3
In this paper, we analyse competition between governments that, in an economically
integrated area with ﬁscal externalities, care about their relative performance or, in a
dynamic version, imitate (with some experimentation) well-performing policies of other
governments. We do so in the most widely used framework in ﬁscal federalism, the
Zodrow-Mieszkowski (1986) or Wilson (1986) tax competition model, where a government-
provided consumption good or input factor has to be ﬁnanced out of a source tax on mobile
capital. For absolute payoﬀ maximization, this model predicts ineﬃcient allocations: If
Vuchelen (1998) for local public expenditures in Belgium; Fredriksson et al. (2004) for multiple policy
instruments in the US.
2See, e.g., Oates (1999) or Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) on welfare reforms in the U.S., or Borr´ as and
Jacobsson (2004) on the Open Method of Coordination in the EU.
3Some contributions deal, however, with the eﬃciency of policy search under various degrees of ﬁscal
decentralization (Kollman et al., 2000) or with the incentives to innovate in federations (Kotsogiannis
and Schwager, 2008).
2the government provides a consumption good, the Nash equilibrium in tax competition
entails underprovision and too low taxes while the tax-ﬁnanced provision of an input
factor may lead to under- or overprovision, depending on properties of the production
technology (Noiset, 1995; Dhillon et al., 2007). Ineﬃciencies (in whatever direction) are
more pronounced the more jurisdictions are involved in the ﬁscal game (Hoyt, 1991). The
worst case is the “competitive” one with a large (technically: inﬁnite) number of small
jurisdictions.
Turning to relative rather than absolute payoﬀ maximization, evolutionary stable strate-
gies (ESS) are the appropriate solution concept (Schaﬀer, 1988). Interestingly, analysing
the game in a dynamic version where local governments adopt, with some experimen-
tation, best practices yields the same outcome: the set of possible long-run outcomes
(precisely, the set of stochastically stable states) of imitation dynamics with experimen-
tation (only) contains ESS. Hence, in a meaningful way, relative payoﬀ-maximization and
mimicking behaviour can be viewed as equivalent: they both lead to ESS.
Even more interestingly, whatever the number of participating jurisdictions, the ESS
in a tax competition game is always the same and it coincides with the competitive
Nash equilibrium (i.e., the Nash equilibrium in the tax competition game played among
inﬁnitely many jurisdictions). This, however, implies that relative performance concerns
(or, for that reason, imitative behaviour) in tax competition lead to worse performance
than absolute payoﬀ-maximization. This result holds regardless of the direction into which
the ineﬃciency goes; relative payoﬀ concerns accelerate a race-to-the-bottom as well as a
race-over-the-top.
A rough intuition for this is as follows:4 With relative payoﬀ concerns, there are (in prin-
ciple) two ways to improve one’s position: increasing one’s own payoﬀ or making that of
others deteriorate (spiteful behaviour; Hamilton, 1970). For absolute payoﬀ maximization
only the ﬁrst channel is relevant. In tax competition games with mobile capital harm can
be imposed on other governments if one lures capital out of their jurisdiction by, say,
lowering one’s tax rate or oﬀering more public inputs. The incentive for undercutting or
overbidding is already present in standard tax competition but is further incited when
relative concerns enter. Hence, policy instruments are used in a more aggressive way –
and ineﬃciencies are worsened.
This observation casts a shadow on the Hayekian view on tax competition. Laboratory
federalism with experimentation and imitation of best practise appears less benign than
4More detailed intuition will be provided in Section 2.4.
3the narrative of the “discovery procedure” wishes to imply. Imitation (even of well-
performing policies) is a boundedly rational form of behaviour. With externalities among
actors there is no guarantee that it will lead to an eﬃcient outcome in the aggregate (see
Al` os-Ferrer and Schlag, 2009). Tax competition and ﬁscal federalism seem to be a case
in point.
In summary, behavioural tax competition – when governments care for relative perfor-
mance or, likewise, mimic best practises – makes ﬁscal interaction more competitive, even
if there are only very few jurisdictions involved. This result (although not the mechan-
ics behind it) is akin to ﬁndings from oligopoly theory: In a Cournot oligopoly, relative
payoﬀ maximization leads to competitive outcomes (rather than to the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium): prices are set to equate marginal costs (Vega-Redondo, 1997).
Let us emphasize the novel ingredients in our analysis, compared to existing literature
on tax competition. Our approach diﬀers from yardstick competition in that it does,
ﬁrst, not build on information issues and, second, includes ﬁscal externalities – which are
absent from the standard models of yardstick competition.5 Our approach is distinguished
from standard tax competition games by assuming relative payoﬀ maximization. And our
approach allows for a dynamic, Hayekian interpretation of tax competition as a diﬀusion
mechanism for best practices (although with some unwarranted results).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 analyses ﬁscal interaction in a
scenario where taxes on mobile capital go to ﬁnance a government-provided consumption
good. Nash equilibria (absolute payoﬀ maximization) and ESS (relative performance
concerns and/or imitative behaviour) are derived and compared. Section 3 does the
same for a ﬁscal game with public input provision where tax competition may lead to
overprovision/overtaxation. Section 4 brieﬂy concludes.
2 Tax competition with public consumption goods
2.1 The model
The framework for our analysis of tax competition stems from the seminal contributions
by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986, Section 2), Wilson (1986), or Hoyt (1991). We con-
sider an economically integrated area with a ﬁnite, but not necessarily large number n > 1
5This is highlighted by Bordignon et al. (2004). Externalities in yardstick competition are information
spill-overs.
4of identical jurisdictions.6 Each jurisdiction i ∈ {1,...,n} is inhabited by one (represen-
tative) immobile household who owns an (unmodelled) ﬁxed factor and some initial stock
of capital ¯ k > 0. Capital is costlessly mobile and can be invested at home or in any other
jurisdiction.
Each jurisdiction produces a single output yi (which also serves as the num´ eraire), em-
ploying an amount ki of capital invested and the ﬁxed factor. The production technology
is represented by a production function yi = f(ki), with f0(k) > 0 > f00(k) for all k > 0.
To avoid uninteresting corner solutions, we assume that f satisﬁes Inada-type conditions
(i.e., f0(0) → ∞ and f0(∞) → 0).
Local output yi can be costlessly transformed into consumption, ci, or a government-
provided good or service, gi (hence, the marginal rate of transformation between the
private and the publicly provided good is one). Expenditures for the publicly provided
good or service have to be ﬁnanced with a proportional tax on the amount of capital
invested in the jurisdiction. Governments maintain balanced budgets. Denoting the
capital tax rate in jurisdiction i by ti we, thus, require
ti · ki = gi for all i = 1,...,n.
Given the perfect mobility of capital within the economic area, in a capital market equi-
librium the net-of-tax return on capital will be equalized across jurisdictions. With
capital taxes t = (t1,...,tn), a capital market equilibrium is a distribution of capital
(k1(t),...,kn(t)) and a level of ρ(t) such that:
f
0(ki(t)) − ti = ρ(t) for i = 1,...,n; (1)
n X
i=1
ki(t) = n · ¯ k. (2)
The representative individual in i cares for private consumption and the publicly provided
good; his preferences are reﬂected by a utility function
u
i = U(ci,gi)
(i = 1,...,n), where U is monotonically increasing in both arguments and strictly quasi-
concave. Partial derivatives of U are denoted through subscripts (e.g., Ug or Ucg). We
6Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) model a purely competitive setup (jurisdictions
perceive themselves to have no impact on the economy-wide rate of return on capital). Our speciﬁcation
encompasses that case when n is very large. Also see Section 2.4.
5assume that both c and g are normal goods.7 Private consumption emerges as output
plus the return on net capital exports minus local taxes:
ci = f(ki) − tiki + ρ(¯ k − ki).
The straightforward comparative statics of the ki(t) and of ρ(t) can be obtained from (1)
and (2) via the Implicit Function Theorem. We ﬁrst conﬁrm that higher taxes levied in














We henceforth capture the domestic eﬀects of tax changes by the elasticity of capital



























for all i. Ob*serve that with a symmetric tax vector (ti = t for all i) all jurisdictions
employ the same amount of capital, which is equal to their initial endowment: ki = ¯ k.

























for all i 6= j. Let us introduce some special notation for symmetric situations. When all
jurisdictions set the same tax rate (i.e., t = (t,...,t) for some t ∈ T), then ki(t) = ¯ k
for all i. Attending are levels of private and of public consumption that are identical
7Formally, UggUc−UcgUg < 0 and UccUg−UcgUc < 0. This assumption ensures that ∂(Ug/Uc)/∂g < 0.
6across jurisdictions, but that vary with the common tax rate t. We shall denote these
consumption levels by ¯ c(t) and ¯ g(t). Observe that ¯ g(t) = f(¯ k) − ¯ c(t). Similarly, we
write as ¯ η(t;n) the value of ηi(t) at a symmetric tax vector with rate t in a setting of n










When setting their capital taxes, governments care for the utility of their representative
citizens and take into account that capital relocates upon tax changes.
2.2 Payoﬀs and solution concepts
Given taxes t and an attending capital market equilibrium, jurisdiction i’s (absolute)
payoﬀ can be expressed as
π(ti;t−i) = U
 
f(ki(t)) − tiki(t) + ρ(t)(¯ k − ki(t)),tiki(t)

. (6)
Here t−i contains all tax rates other than that of country i. The payoﬀ function (6) is
symmetric: payoﬀs do not depend on a jurisdiction’s index and are invariant to permu-
tations of the other jurisdictions’ strategies. Each jurisdiction chooses a tax rate from a
common strategy set, given by a compact set of tax rates T = [0,¯ t] where ¯ t < ∞.8
As the game is symmetric, we focus on symmetric equilibria. Let us recall the deﬁnitions
of symmetric Nash equilibrium and ﬁnite-population evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
and shortly comment on the diﬀerence between the two concepts.






N) for all t ∈ T.






E) for all t ∈ T.
In a Nash equilibrium no jurisdiction would strictly beneﬁt from a deviation, given the tax
rates of the other jurisdictions. In an evolutionarily stable proﬁle no jurisdiction would
be able to gain a strict relative advantage by deviating. While in a Nash equilibrium
8Presupposing some – potentially very high – upper bound on tax rates is innocuous; it just keeps
strategy sets compact.
7one compares the deviator’s payoﬀs before and after deviation, in an evolutionarily stable
proﬁle one compares the payoﬀs to a (single) deviator, choosing tax rate t, with the payoﬀs
to the non-deviators, choosing tE (Schaﬀer, 1988). If the number of jurisdictions is ﬁnite
and each jurisdiction has non-negligible impact on the payoﬀs of all others, it may pay in
relative terms to deviate from a Nash equilibrium, if the loss imposed on non-deviators
exceeds the loss suﬀered by the deviator itself. Conversely, there may be incentives, in
terms of absolute payoﬀs, to deviate from an ESS. However, by deﬁnition, any deviatior
would be worse oﬀ in relative terms after such deviation. This holds even if the deviating
government cleverly chooses its deviation as a best reply to the other governments’ tax
rates.
A Nash equilibrium will emerge when governments strive for absolute payoﬀ maximization.
The ESS, however, is the appropriate solution concept where governments care about
their comparative performance. As observed by Schaﬀer (1988), an ESS corresponds to
a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game with relative payoﬀs. Formally, an ESS is a













As (7) indicates, a ﬁnite-population ESS does not generally correspond to a Nash equi-
librium strategy of the original game (see Guse et al., 2008). As we shall see soon, Nash
equilibrium and ESS do indeed diﬀer signiﬁcantly in a tax competition game.
2.3 Nash equilibrium
The (symmetric) Nash equilibrium of the Zodrow-Mieszkowski model is well understood.




































With symmetry (ti = tN and, consequently, ki = ¯ k for all i), rearranging terms leads to
the following equilibrium condition:
Ug(¯ c(tN), ¯ g(tN))
Uc(¯ c(tN), ¯ g(tN))
=
1
1 + ¯ η(tN;n)
. (8)
Observe that, for all t > 0,
n
0 > n =⇒ ¯ η(t;n
0) > ¯ η(t;n).
8Hence, together with the normality of c and g we obtain the following well-known propo-
sition:9
Result 1 (i) (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986) Tax competition leads to an underpro-
vision of publicly provided goods.
(ii) (Hoyt, 1991) This underprovision is more pronounced the higher n, i.e., the more
jurisdictions are involved in the tax competition game.
The case n → ∞ is often referred to as the small-jurisdiction or competitive scenario; this
is the case originally envisaged in Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). From Result 1(ii), it
is the scenario where tax competition is sharpest and the underprovision problem most
severe.
2.4 ESS
























Following Tanaka (2000), a strategy tE is an ESS if and only if it solves the above problem






9An eﬃcient provision level g∗ satisﬁes
Ug(f(¯ k) − g∗,g∗)
Uc(f(¯ k) − g∗,g∗)
= 1.
For a Nash equilibrium we get from (8) that
Ug(f(¯ k) − g(tN),g(tN))
Uc(f(¯ k) − g(tN),g(tN))
> 1.
Normality of c and g then implies that g(tN) < g∗. The monotonicity of g(tN) in n follows by a similar
token.
9If (9) holds, ψ takes its maximum value, which is zero. Without loss in generality, we use
in the following labels “1” and “2” to indicate, respectively, the mutant and a non-mutant









































































At a symmetric proﬁle (t = t0), we have t1[t0,t0] = t2[t0,t0] and k1 = k2 = ¯ k. Moreover,























= −¯ kUc(¯ c(t
0), ¯ g(t









As a maximizer of ψ, an ESS tE solves ∂ψ/∂t = 0 or, equivalently, satisﬁes the following
condition:
Ug(¯ c(tE), ¯ g(tE))
Uc(¯ c(tE), ¯ g(tE))
=
¯ k
¯ k + tE/f00(¯ k)
=
1
1 + ¯ η(tE,∞)
. (13)
Hence,
Result 2 An ESS of a tax competition game is, for any number of jurisdictions, identical
to the Nash equilibrium in a competitive tax competition.
An ESS in tax competition has the following properties: It is independent of the num-
ber of jurisdictions, and it always11 coincides with the “competitive” Nash equilibrium.
10With a slight abuse in notation we denote by ∂k1/∂t := ∂k1(t;t0,...,t0)/∂t1, i.e., the derivative of
k1(t1) with respect to the ﬁrst argument (i.e., with respect to jurisdiction 1’s own tax rate). By ∂k2/∂t
we correspondingly mean the partial derivative ∂k2(t0;t,t0,...,t0)/∂t1 – i.e., again the derivative with
respect to jurisdiction 1’s tax rate. Likewise we proceed with derivatives of ρ.
11In case of n → ∞, the identity of a (unique) Nash equilibrium and ESS is a standard result; it follows
from the fact the ESS reﬁnes Nash equilibria.
10Governments with concerns about relative performance exacerbate the underprovision
problem, as compared to “normal” tax competition. As a consequence, also social welfare
u is strictly lower.
Let us ﬁrst provide an intuition why tax competition is sharper when based on relative
performance. Assume a symmetric situation such that capital is distributed uniformly over
the economic area and all governments obtain the same payoﬀ level. When contemplating
a tax change, a government that only cares about its own payoﬀ would assess whether
the eﬀects on local private consumption outweigh the eﬀects on government-provided
good (which works through the government budget); this is the essence of (8) or of the
ﬁrst line in (11). A government that cares about its relative standing vis-` a-vis other
governments additionally takes into account the eﬀects on private consumption and the
government budget elsewhere. In a symmetric situation a (small) tax change in i does
not aﬀect private consumption in j. However, a tax cut in i leads (via the outﬂow of
capital from j) to lower tax revenues in j and, thus, to a reduction in the provision of
the government good. The resulting deterioration of social welfare in j is, however, to
the relative advantage of i.12 Concerns about relative performance involve an additional
beneﬁt from tax reductions. Being able to worsen the budgetary situation elsewhere by
cutting taxes at home sharpens the incentives for lowering taxes. As a consequence, the
underprovision of government-provided goods exacerbates.
To understand why the ESS of the tax competition game is (unlike the Nash equilibrium)
independent of the number of participating jurisdictions, verify from (12) that changes in
relative payoﬀs are, starting from a symmetric situation, driven by diﬀerentials in capital
investments, i.e., by the change of (ki − kj). From (3) and (4) it is formally clear that
∂(ki − kj)/∂ti is independent of n. An economic argument comes from the no-arbitrage






















Hence, the eﬀect of a jurisdiction’s tax rate on its own capital can be decomposed into
a direct tax eﬀect (captured by “1” in the square brackets) and a rate-of-return eﬀect
∂ρ/∂ti. The cross-border impact of changes in ti on kj is only driven by this rate-of-
return eﬀect – which is common to all jurisdictions and which is weaker when there are
more jurisdictions over which it can be spread (see (5)). For the relative positions of
jurisdictions, this common rate-of-return eﬀect is irrelevant in symmetric situations; it
12This is sometimes referred to as spiteful behaviour in evolutionary game theory (Hamilton, 1970).
11cancels out in ∂(ki − kj)/∂ti. Only the direct tax eﬀect survives, which, however, is
independent of the number of jurisdictions. Consequently, the ESS is independent of n,
too.
The cancelling-out of the common rate-of-return with relative payoﬀ comparisons also
helps to explain why the ESS coincides with the competitive Nash equilibrium. The latter
emerges if jurisdictions do not (perceive to) have an impact on the equilibrium rate of
return (for n → ∞, none of the jurisdictions has market power: ∂ρ/∂ti = 0). Though the
cause is diﬀerent,13 this irrelevance of changes in ρ has the same eﬀect as in an ESS.
The result that the ESS in tax competition corresponds to the competitive case of “nor-
mal” tax competition is in line with observations in the oligopoly literature. E.g., the ESS
in Cournot games coincides with the Walrasian (= price-taking, competitive) outcome (see
Vega-Redondo, 1997; Al` os-Ferrer and Ania, 2005).
2.5 Mimicking and ESS
So far, the use of ESS as a solution concept in tax competition has been motivated by the
presumption that governments care about relative performance. As discussed in the intro-
duction, substantial empirical evidence suggests that governments mimic the behaviour
of other governments. One might conjecture that such mimicking is behaviourally related
to concerns for relative performance. Relying on ideas developed by Kandori and Rob
(1995), Kandori et al. (1993), and Vega-Redondo (1997), we make this connection precise
here.
Suppose the tax competition game is played in each period over a long time horizon, say
in periods τ = 0,1,2,.... Instead of assuming that t can be continuously chosen from an
interval [0,¯ t], we shall assume that there is a (suitably ﬁne) grid G = {0,δ,2δ,...,νδ}
with δ > 0 and ν ∈ N, but arbitrary, from which tax rates can be chosen.14 We assume
that tE is on the grid. Any tax rate adopted by a jurisdiction has to come from the grid
G.
Consider the following imitation dynamics with experimentation:
• Imitation: In each period τ ≥ 1 each government mimics one of the tax rates that
13Formally, this can be seen from the second-order conditions of the attending maximization problems.
See Tanaka (2000) for a discussion in an oligopoly context.
14This assumption is made for tractability. Moreover, it matches reality – where the grid density is
measured in (tenths of) percentage points – even better than the continuum assumption. For discussion
of a continuum of strategies see, e.g., Schenk-Hopp´ e (2000).
12performed best (in terms of absolute payoﬀs) in the previous period. A government
that was among the best performers in the previous period will not change its
strategy. If all governments chose the same tax rate in the previous period, then no
adjustment will occur.
• Experimentation: With independent probability ε > 0, each government ignores the
rule to imitate and chooses a tax rate in G according to some probability distribution
with full support on G.
Experimentation, thus, is any deviation from copycat behaviour. It may occur due to
error, inertia, political considerations outside the model etc. Since experimentation has
full support, it also encompasses to (occasionally) choose best-response tax rates.
A state of these imitation dynamics is an element of Gn. The dynamics is an (ergodic)
Markov chain in discrete time, indexed by the experimentation probability ε. The stochas-
tically stable states are those tax vectors t ∈ Gn that are in the support of the (limit)
invariant distribution of the Markov chain as ε goes to zero (Kandori et al., 1993). They
can be interpreted as the long-run outcomes of the rule to imitate best-performing tax
strategies.
Kandori and Rob (1995) showed that the stochastically stable states comprise those
monomorphic states t = (t,...,t) ∈ Gn where the minimum number of experiments
needed to reach t is as small as possible. It is therefore helpful to introduce the concept of
a globally surviving strategy (alternatively labelled invading or (n − 1)-stable strategy).




G,t,...,t) for all t ∈ T.
Hence, a GSS is a tax rate that, if set by a single experimentator, can invade any proﬁle
where all other jurisdictions adopt an identical but diﬀerent tax rate.15 The crucial feature
of the tax competition game is that the globally survivng strategy and the ESS coincide.
Formally,
Lemma 1 tG = tE (as implicitly deﬁned in (13)) is the unique globally surviving strategy
of the tax competition game.
15Consider a situation where all jurisdictions set the same tax rate t. If, when only one jurisdiction
experiments with a diﬀerent tax tG and then its social welfare is higher than anywhere else, and this
holds for all strategies t 6= tG, we call tG globally surviving.





where ψ was deﬁned in the previous subsection. Following Tanaka (2000), a strategy tG






However, then tG is also an ESS (see (9)). 
By deﬁnition, in the imitation dynamics a globally stable state can be reached from any
other monomorphic state after only one jurisdiction experiments with strategy tG. On
the other hand, to leave a state where an ESS tE is played to any other monomorphic
state, it takes at least two experimentaing jurisdictions. This distinguishes an ESS from
all other strategies. From Lemma 1, tG and tE are identical in our set-up. Hence, the
likelihood that t = (tE,...,tE) is reached or maintained is higher than the likelihood that
any other monomorphic state is reached or maintained. Consequently,16
Result 3 For the tax competition game, t = (tE,...,tE) is the unique stochastically
stable state of the imitation dynamics with experimentation.
This result indicates a close connection (precisely, an equivalence) between relative payoﬀ
maximization and the behavioural rule of adopting best practises. Moreover, in con-
junction with Result 2, it states that adopting best practises in tax competition games
will lead to a competitive situation with substantial underprovision of publicly provided
consumption goods.
3 Tax competition with publicly provided inputs
So far, we have discussed tax competition when the governments use their tax revenues to
ﬁnance a consumption good. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) also discuss the case that
government proceeds go to ﬁnance a public input. As was pointed out by Noiset (1995),
Sinn (1997) or Dhillon et al. (2007), it is unclear in such a setup whether tax competition
16A similar result for Cournot oligopoly is obtained in Tanaka (2000). Alternatively, the proof could be
built on the Radius-Coradius-Theorem as in Ania and Al` os-Ferrer (2005, Prop. 4). Also see Al` os-Ferrer
and Schlag (2009, Section 3.2).
14triggers an under- or an overprovision of the public input. This makes ﬁscal competition
with public inputs an interesting object of study also under the behavioural assumption
that governments care for relative payoﬀs.
3.1 The model
We adopt the framework from Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986, Section 3) or Noiset (1995):
As before, an economically integrated area consists of n > 1 identical jurisdictions, each
inhabited by one (representative) immobile household who owns an (unmodelled) ﬁxed
factor and some initial stock of capital ¯ k > 0. Again, capital can be invested at home or
abroad and is costlessly mobile.
Each country i produces a single output yi (which also serves as the num´ eraire). At a
unit marginal rate of transformation, yi can be used either for consumption, ci, or as a
publicly provided input, zi, for production (say infrastructure). In addition to z, inputs
in production are the amount ki of capital invested in jurisdiction i, and the ﬁxed factor.
The production technology is represented by a strictly quasi-convace production function
yi = f(ki,zi) with positive, but decreasing marginal productivities (fk(k,z),fz(k,z) > 0
and fkk(k,z),fzz(k,z) < 0). The Inada conditions are assumed to hold.
As before, government expenditures are ﬁnanced through a source tax on capital. The
government’s budget constraint, thus, reads as
tiki = zi.
The representative household in each country only cares about consumption, which is
given by
ci = yi − tiki + ρ(¯ k − ki).
Again, ρ denotes the (equilibrium) rate of return on capital, implicitly deﬁned by the
no-arbitrage condition
fk(ki,zi) − ti = ρ for all i.
In this set of equations, we can replace the zi by the national budget constraints. Together
with the requirement that all capital be invested somewhere in the economic area (
P
ki =
n·¯ k), we then express the capital market equilibrium as a function merely of the tax rates
t = (t1,...,tn): ki = ki(t) and ρ = ρ(t). As in Section 2, we will focus on symmetric tax
15vectors (ti = t and ki = ¯ k for all i). We deﬁne shortcuts
A(t) := fkk(¯ k,t¯ k) + t · fkz(¯ k,t¯ k)
B(t) := ¯ k · fkz(¯ k,t¯ k) − 1.
It can be shown that A(t) < 0 in an equilibrium.17 For symmetric t = (t,...,t), compar-



















Higher taxes in a jurisdiction will decrease the amount of capital invested there and,
consequently, increase the amount of capital elsewhere if and only if B(t) < 0.
As individuals only care for consumption, a benevolent government will pursue the maxi-
mization of ci as its policy objective. Expressed as functions of the tax vector, government
payoﬀs πi = ci emerge as
πi = π(ti;t−i) = f(ki(t),tiki(t)) − tiki(t) + ρ(t) · (¯ k − ki(t)). (17)
We now analyse symmetric Nash equilibria and ESS, analogously deﬁned as in Section 2.2.
3.2 Nash equilibria


























17See Noiset (1995, footnote 5). A(t) < 0 is equivalent to the budget deﬁcit, z − tk, being (locally)
increasing in z. In a symmetric situation A(t) > 0 would imply that a marginal increase in z ﬁnances
itself and leads to a (small) budget surplus. This cannot hold in an optimum.
18For arbitrary (non-symmetric) tax vectors, deﬁne shortcuts Ai := fkk(ki,tiki) + ti · fkz(ki,tiki) and
























(where i 6= j). The symmetric case follows easily.
16In a symmetric Nash equilibrium (ti = tN for all i), this condition holds at ki = ¯ k. Hence,
using (15) and (16), a symmetric Nash equilibrium is characterized by:
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Condition (18) implies that
fz(¯ k,t
N¯ k) ≥ 1 ⇐⇒ B(t
N) ≤ 0
⇐⇒ ¯ k · fkz(¯ k,t¯ k) ≤ 1. (19)
Result 4 (i) (Noiset, 1995) The Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game with
publicly provided inputs entails underprovision [overprovision] of the government-
provided good if k · fkz(k,z) < 1 [if k · fkz(k,z) > 1].
(ii) Both underprovision and overprovision will be more pronounced the larger the num-
ber of countries, n.
Proof:
(i) Eﬃciency requires that fz(¯ k,z) = 1 (recall that the MRT between private consump-
tion and the publicly provided good equals one). The ﬁrst item of the proposition
thus follows from (19) and the strict concavity of f(¯ k,z) in z.
(ii) Observe that (18) implicitly deﬁnes the Nash equilibrium tax rate (which is a per-
fect indicator for over- or underprovision since z = t¯ k) as a function of n. Treating
n as a continuous variable for sake of simplicity, we get that ∂tN/∂n = −
∂Γ/∂n
∂Γ/∂t.
Here, the denominator is negative from the second-order condition (recall that tN
is a maximizer). Hence, tN is increasing [decreasing] in n whenever Γ increases
[decreases] in n. As the term (n−1)/n grows in n and as A(tN) is negative, Γ (and
thus tN) increases [decreases] in n if and only if B > 0 [if B < 0]. In conjunction
with item (i), the claim follows. 
Tax competition, thus, typically results in an ineﬃcient allocation. However, depending
on the strength with which the publicly provided input aﬀects the marginal productivity
of capital, also a race-over-the-top with respect to tax rates is possible. Speciﬁcally, the
condition for underprovision (k · fkz(k,z) < 1) requires that an extra unit of the publicly
provided input raises the marginal productivity of capital by less than its marginal cost
for investors in terms of additional taxation. Generally, the ineﬃciency (in whatever
direction) is more pronounced the more countries participate in the tax competition game.
173.3 ESS
To derive ESS, we proceed as in Section 2.5. Given two tax rates t,t0 ∈ T, we deﬁne
variables t1[t,t0], t2[t,t0], and ψ(t,t0) as before, replacing π by (17). Hence, we are now












1) · (¯ k2(t
2) − k1(t
1)) (20)
at t = t0 (observe that ρ(t1) = ρ(t2)). Partial diﬀerentiation, applying the notational





















At a symmetric proﬁle (t = t0), we have t1 = t2, k1 = k2 = ¯ k, and z1 = z2 = t0¯ k. Since an
ESS tE maximizes ψ(t,tE), it satisﬁes
−¯ k + fz ·










or, using (15) and (16),











The LHS corresponds to Γ(tE,∞). In analogy with Result 2 we, thus, obtain
Result 5 An ESS of a tax competition game with publicly provided inputs is, for any
number of countries, identical to the competitive Nash equilibrium of that game.
As in Section 2, the ESS of the tax competition game is independent of the number of
participating jurisdictions (unlike the Nash equilibrium). Compared to tax competition
with payoﬀ maximization, relative payoﬀ concerns exacerbate ineﬃciencies. In contrast to
the framework in Section 2, the ineﬃciency here may imply an overprovison of government
goods (too high tax rates). Relative payoﬀ concerns, thus, not only accelerate races-to-
the-bottom but also speed up races-over-the-top.
The intuition for Result 5 is similar to that for Result 2. Depending on whether a higher
tax rate in one jurisdiction reduces or increases the amount of capital invested in other
jurisdictions (i.e., depending on whether B > 0 or B < 0), relative performance concerns
in tax competition trigger an additional incentive (out of spite) for each jurisdiction to
18increase or to lower the own tax rate. Such a move would widen the diﬀerential in
capital stocks (i.e., ki − kj). The magnitude of this eﬀect is independent of the number
of jurisdictions since, as above, repercussions through the net-rate-of-return cancel out.
Irrelevance of the number of jurisdictions, however, is de facto identical to the competitive
scenario in tax competition with absolute payoﬀ maximization.
Also for tax competition with publicly provided inputs we can analyse imitation dynam-
ics with experimentation as in Section 2.5. As the result is identical, we refrain from
elaborating on this here: the ESS (or, from Result 5, the competitive Nash equilibrium)
emerges as the unique stochastically stable state.
4 Conclusions
Governments that care for their standing vis-` a-vis fellow governments elsewhere or gov-
ernments that copy (successful) policies from elsewhere engage in more aggressive ﬁscal
competition than those focussed on payoﬀ maximization. Their incentives to underbid
each other in tax rates or to overbid one another with public infrastructure are sharpened.
As a consequence, aggregate and individual performance in tax competition is worse than
with governments that set tax policies as best replies in a ﬁscal game.
We arrived at these ﬁndings in the standard tax competition framework due to Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986). Being a workhorse in the theory of ﬁscal federalism, this model has
undergone many modiﬁcations and extensions (see Wilson, 1999, for a survey). In future
research, these variants of tax competition could be analysed from a behavioural perspec-
tive on governments, allowing for relative performance concerns and copycat strategies.
Given that in games with a small number of players, the relationship between ESS and
Nash equilibria is still not fully understood (see Guse et al., 2008, or Al` os-Ferrer and
Ania, 2005), many interesting and potentially surprising results on tax competition can
be expected from such studies.
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